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Let History Be Our Guide:
Using Historical Analogies to Analyze
State Response to a Post-Granholm Era
MATIHEW B. MILus*
Behold the rain which descends from heaven upon our vineyards, and which
incorporates itself with the grapes to be changed into wine; a constant proof that
God loves us, and loves to see us happy!
- Benjamin Franklin'
INTRODUCTION
On May 16, 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its much
anticipated decision in Granholm v. Heald.2 The Court held that both Michigan's and
New York's wine shipment regulations "discriminate against interstate commerce in
violation of the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and that the discrimination is
neither authorized nor permitted by the 21 st Amendment."
3
While this case directly struck down only Michigan's and New York's direct
shipment laws, it symbolized something much greater. "Underlying the case [was] a
battle between 3,000 small, family-owned wineries in all 50 states that [could not] get
national distribution and large wholesalers who oppose direct-to-consumer wine
shipments . . ... 4 This battle has been raging for years. By prohibiting facial
discrimination against out-of-state wineries to protect the interests of in-state wineries,
the Court handed these small winery owners a victory. However, this is only one
victory in a battle that will continue to rage.
Underlying the battle in Granholm is the inherent conflict between two
constitutional doctrines: the 21 st Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause. The
Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power .. .To regulate
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A. & B.S.
2003, Miami University. I would first like to thank my parents for always providing the support
and love that have driven me to succeed. I would also like to thank my fianc6e, Christie, for
putting up with me through three stressful years of law school. I love you all. Thanks also to
Professor Alexander Tanford for his advice and guidance during the research phase of this note;
and to the Notes and Comments Editors of the Indiana Law Journal, in particular Robert
Brown.
1. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to the Abbe Morellet, in 5 MEMomS OF THE LIFE OF
BENJAMIN FRANKLN 289 (William Temple Franklin ed., London, Henry Colburn 1833).
2. 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005).
3. Id. at 1891.
4. Press Release, Wine Institute, Wine Institute Welcomes U.S. Supreme Court Review;
Ending Discrimination Promoted by Wholesalers Would be Win for Consumers, Small,
Wineries, Tax Collectors and Regulators, available at http://www.wineinstitute.org/
communications/statistics/supremecourt.htm (December 3, 2004).
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Commerce... among the several States."5 From this affirmative grant of power, the
Supreme Court has interpreted an implicit or "dormant" limitation on the states' ability
to statutorily restrict interstate commerce.6 In other words, a state cannot impose
serious burdens on the flow of interstate goods across its borders.
On the other side of the conflict stands the 21 st Amendment, which provides: "The
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United
States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited."7 The Amendment clearly puts alcohol into a different
category than all other items of commerce. "What is not clear, however, is precisely to
what extent the [A]mendment makes alcohol different."8 Does it permit states to enact
statutes that would otherwise blatantly violate the dormant Commerce Clause? Prior to
its decision in Granholm, the Supreme Court left this question unanswered, while
states freely discriminated against interstate commerce of alcoholic beverages.
Part I of this Note examines the development of dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Part II provides background information about the rise and fall of
prohibition in the United States, while Part III analyzes 21st Amendment
jurisprudence. Part IV discusses a variety of direct shipment laws, why direct shipment
has become such a salient issue in recent years, and how the different circuit courts
dealt with the interplay between the 21st Amendment and the dormant Commerce
Clause in the years leading up to Granholm. Part V analyzes the Court's decision in
Granholm, focusing specifically on the scope of its holding. Part VI develops an
analytical framework for predicting the likely state reponse to Granholm through an
examination of the states' responses to past unpopular Court decisions.
From this analysis, this Note concludes that states will not simply abandon their
discriminatory alcohol regulations without a fight. Likely, states will respond by
redrafting facially discriminatory laws to be facially neutral. These seemingly neutral
laws will, in effect, perpetuate the discrimination that the Supreme Court sought to
prohibit in Granholm. The Court will then be presented with a string of cases
challenging the constitutionality of these new statutes.
I. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power "to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States." 9 This clause clearly grants Congress
the affirmative power to regulate interstate commerce. However, the Court has also
read the Commerce Clause to limit the states' power to burden or regulate interstate
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6. Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 279 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (1984)
('Tbhe Commerce Clause operates both as a grant of power to the Congress and a limitation on
the power of the States .... ).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI § 2.
8. Justin Lemaire, Note, Unmixing a Jurisprudential Cocktail: Reconciling the Twenty-
first Amendment, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and Federal Appellate Jurisprudence to
Judge the Constitutionality of State Laws Restricting Direct Shipment of Alcohol, 79 NOTRE
DAMEL. REV. 1613, 1614 (2004).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
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commerce.' 0 When Congress passes legislation under its Commerce Clause power, its
laws trump state and local laws.1" Even in the absence of congressional action in a
certain area, the federal courts may still find that state regulation in this area
impermissibly burdens interstate commerce, thus violating the dormant Commerce
Clause. "The dormant Commerce Clause enables federal courts to guard Congress's
commerce power against state protectionism."' 12 Essentially, only Congress can
regulate the flow of goods in interstate commerce; even when Congress is silent
regarding interstate commerce, states are not permitted to step in and enact their own
regulations.
States can violate the dormant Commerce Clause in two main ways: (1) through
discriminating against out-of-state businesses in order to give in-state businesses an
economic advantage; or (2) through statutorily imposing regulations that burden
interstate commerce. 13 Courts will strike down the first type of violation,
"discrimination in fact" or "in practical effect," unless the discrimination can pass
muster under intermediate constitutional scrutiny. In order to do so, the state must
prove that the discriminatory law supports a legitimate purpose of the state that could
not be achieved through less discriminatory means.' 4 The second type of violation,
burdening interstate commerce, is subject to a lower level of judicial scrutiny. Only
clearly excessive burdens in relation to putative local benefits will fail this test. 5
Before the ratification of the 21st Amendment, the dormant Commerce Clause
restricted the states' ability to regulate the importation of alcohol across their borders.'
6
This limitation on the states' authority led to severe problems in enforcing state liquor
laws that were not being handled adequately at the federal level.' 7 This enforcement
issue was one of many factors that led Congress to pass the 21st Amendment, which
turned over control of alcohol to the states.' In the years following the 21st
Amendment's ratification, the Court ruled that the Amendment shielded the states'
10. Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 279 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("'The Commerce Clause operates
both as a grant of power to the Congress and a limitation on the power of the States ... .
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI § 2 ("The Supremacy Clause").
12. Jason E. Prince, Note, New Wine in Old Wineskins: Analyzing State Direct-Shipment
Laws in the Context of Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-first
Amendment, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1563, 1569 (2004).
13. Autumn R. Veatch, Comment, Where Does the Commerce Clause End and the Twenty-
first Amendment Begin Under Bainbridge v. Turner?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REv. 111, 115 (2004).
14. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) ("[Olnce a state law is shown to
discriminate against interstate commerce 'either on its face or in practical effect,' the burden
falls on the State to demonstrate both that the statute 'serves a legitimate local purpose,' and that
this purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means.") (quoting
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
15. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where [a] statute regulates
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.").
16. See Brannon P. Denning, Smokey and the Bandit in Cyberspace: The Dormant
Commerce Clause, The Twenty-first Amendment, and State Regulation of Internet Alcohol
Sales, 19 CONST. CoMMENT. 297, 309 (2002).
17. See id.
18. See Veatch, supra note 13, at 115.
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alcohol regulations from the limitations of the dormant Commerce Clause. 19 Gradually,
beginning in the 1940s, the Supreme Court shifted from granting state alcohol
regulation total immunity from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny to holding that the
federal government retained some control over alcohol regulation. Today, there is no
disputing that the federal government still retains some power over the regulation of
alcohol. However, the question remains: where should the line be drawn between the
dormant Commerce Clause power and the power granted to the states by the 21st
Amendment?
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBMON
A. The Prohibition Movement
The Prohibition Movement began following the Civil War, with the purpose of
fighting "the perceived evils linked with alcoholic beverages." 2' As the movement
22gained force, many states strictly regulated alcohol within their borders. Kansas
became the first state to constitutionally prohibit the production and sale of alcohol.23
Although challenged in Mugler v. Kansas,24 the Supreme Court upheld Kansas's
statute citing the state's broad police powers.25 The Court recognized that once a state
legislature decided upon a method for regulating liquor, "it is not a determination for
the courts, upon their views as to what is best and safest for the community, to
disregard the legislative determination on that question."26
However, just one year after the decision in Mugler, the Court changed its opinion
on the states' broad powers to regulate alcohol. Calling upon the dormant Commerce
Clause, the Court held in Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.2 7 that,
although the states could regulate alcohol within their borders, their regulatory powers
began "only after the act of transportation ha[d] terminated." Two years later, the
Court held that alcohol which remained in its original package constituted an article in
interstate commerce.29 Under this interpretation, citizens of states prohibiting the sale
and manufacture of alcohol could circumvent the prohibition by importing alcohol,
19. See, e.g., Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis
Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939); State Bd. of Equalization v.
Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936); infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
21. Veatch, supra note 13, at 116.
22. See Russ Miller, Note, The Wine Is in the Mail: The Twenty-first Amendment and State
Laws Against the Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages, 54 VAND. L. REv. 2495, 2503-04
(2001).
23. Id. at 2504.
24. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
25. Id. at 664 ("[T]he state, in exercise of her police powers, may lawfully prohibit the
manufacture and sale, within her limits, of intoxicating liquors to be used as a beverage ....
26. Id. at 662.
27. 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
28. Id. at 499.
29. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
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removing the out-of-state packaging, repackaging, and then reselling the alcohol to in-
state consumers.
To rectify this seemingly absurd loophole in states' temperance regulations,
Congress quickly passed the Wilson Act,30 which stated:
All fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into
any State or Territory or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale or storage
therein, shall upon arrival in such State or Territory be subject to the operation and
effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police
powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or
liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and shall not be exempt
therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or
otherwise.3'
Essentially, the Wilson Act gave the states the right to regulate the importation of
liquor; however, it only allowed states to regulate out-of-state liquor to the same degree
as they regulated in-state liquor. The dormant Commerce Clause still prevented states
from banning only the importation of out-of-state liquor.
Although the Wilson Act provided states with broader regulatory power over
alcohol, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act opened yet another loophole for
alcohol importers to exploit. Since the Act prohibited only the sale of liquor and not its
importation, consumers avoided violating the act by purchasing intoxicating liquors
directly from producers through mail orders.32 In Rhodes v. Iowa,33 the Court
addressed this issue, and much to the dismay of prohibitionists, it ruled that the Wilson
Act did not give states that had outlawed the sale and manufacture of alcohol the power
to prohibit out-of-state liquor manufacturers from selling and shipping directly to
consumers.34 Under the Rhodes interpretation of the Wilson Act, alcohol shipments did
not fall under the regulation of state liquor laws until the shipment "arrive[d] at the
point of destination and was deliver[ed] there to the consignee.' Although the state of
Iowa argued that the Act divested alcohol of its interstate nature upon reaching the
state border, the Court disagreed. Therefore, states were unable to regulate alcohol
shipments until the shipments fell into the hands of the consumers. As a result, "[m] ail
order booze, of course, flourished."
36
In the end, however, temperance advocates prevailed, eventually persuading
Congress to strip alcohol of its interstate character, which allowed states to regulate
alcohol free from the confines of the dormant Commerce Clause. In 1913, Congress
passed the Webb-Kenyon Act,37 which prohibited the importation of liquor into any
30. Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2002)) (also
known as the "Original Packages Act").
31. Id.
32. Prince, supra note 12, at 1575.
33. 170 U.S. 412 (1898).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 426.
36. Prince, supra note 12, at 1575 (quoting Sidney J. Spaeth, Comment, The Twenty-first
Amendment and State Control Over Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest,
79 CAL. L. REv. 161, 173 (1991)).
37. Webb-Kenyon Act, Pub. L. No. 68-398,37 Stat. 699 (1913) (officially entitled "An Act
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state with the intent to violate the laws of that state. The language of the Webb-Kenyon
Act was strikingly similar to what became Section 2 of the 21st Amendment:
The shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any means whatsoever, of any
... intoxicating liquor of any kind, from one State... into any other State ... or
from any foreign country into any State... which said... intoxicating liquor is
intended, by any person interested therein, to be received, possessed, sold, or in
any manner used . . . in violation of any law of such State ...is hereby
prohibited.3"
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act in James S. Clark Distilling Co. v.
Western Maryland Railway Co.,39 a mere two years before the ratification of the
Eighteenth Amendment and the beginning of nationalized Prohibition.
B. National Prohibition: From the Eighteenth to the Twenty-first
Although the Webb-Kenyon Act was an enormous victory for temperance
advocates, it did not fully satiate their appetite for Prohibition. In 1919, Prohibitionists
finally achieved their ultimate goal with the Eighteenth Amendment's ratification and
the beginning of full-scale nationalized Prohibition.4° Despite pressure in favor of the
initial passage of the Amendment, Prohibition was problematic from the start .4 Due to
countless enforcement problems, "[i]t was only slightly more difficult to buy liquor
under Prohibition than it had been prior to its passage. ' 2 Gangsters bootlegging liquor
and government corruption led President Harding to eventually concede that
Prohibition had evolved into a "nationwide scandal.",4 3 The federal government's
inability to enforce alcohol regulations on a national level led many in Congress to
begin pushing for a return to state control of liquor.44
In response to the failure of the "noble experiment," the states ratified the 21st
Amendment, which officially ended national Prohibition. 5 The Amendment is split
into three sections, with the first expressly repealing the Eighteenth Amendment46 and
the third setting a seven-year time limit on ratification.47 The most important of the
three parts is Section 2, which declares that "[t]he transportation or importation into
any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."'48 While the
Divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in certain cases") (codified as
amended at 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2000)).
38. Id.
39. 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
41. See Marc Aaron Melzer, Comment, A Vintage Conflict Uncorked: The 21st
Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the Fully-Ripened Fight over Interstate Wine and
Liquor Sales, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 279, 283 (2004).
42. Id. at 283-84.
43. LAURENCE F. ScHMEcKEBIER, THE BuREAu OF PROHIBION 46 (1929).
44. Prince, supra note 12, at 1576-77.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
46. Id. § l.
47. Id. § 3.
48. Id. § 2.
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Eighteenth Amendment gave "concurrent power to enforce" prohibition to the federal
government and states,49 the 21st Amendment appeared to give the states alone the
power.
50
II. 21 ST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. The "Absolutist" Approach: State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market
Co.
5 1
The 21st Amendment holds a unique position in our Constitution as the only
amendment to "repeal[] one constitutional provision and create[] an exception to
another." 52 The speed at which Congress repealed national Prohibition through the
enactment of the 21st Amendment is a true example of "the will of a nation speaking
through its constitutional process." 53 But what was the will of the nation at that time?
Was it to simply give the states the power to make the prohibition choice for
themselves, or did it grant the states a broader power to regulate alcohol completely, as
the Amendment's plain text may suggest?
In the early years following ratification, the Supreme Court took a very literal,
textual approach to the interpretation of Section 2, holding that it granted the states
absolute power to regulate alcohol unfettered by the confines of the dormant
Commerce Clause. 54 In State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., the
plaintiffs challenged a five hundred dollar importers' license fee that applied only to
out-of-state alcohol importers, claiming that the fee violated both the Commerce
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 55 Although the
Court found both arguments unconvincing and ruled for the defendants, the Court did
give some definition to the bounds of the 21st Amendment. Justice Brandeis, in his
majority opinion, responded to the plaintiffs' claim that the fee violated the dormant
Commerce Clause:
Prior to the [21st] Amendment it would obviously have been unconstitutional to
have imposed any fee for that privilege [of importing alcohol].... [But the 21st
Amendment] confer[s] upon the state the power to forbid all importations which
do not comply with the conditions which it prescribes. The plaintiffs... request us
to construe the [A]mendment as saying, in effect: The state may prohibit the
importation of intoxicating liquors provided it prohibits the manufacture and sale
within its boarders [sic]; but if it permits such manufacture and sale, it must let
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
50. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
51. 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
52. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 2004).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939) (holding that a
state's right to regulate the importation of intoxicating liquors is not limited by the Commerce
Clause); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939) (same);
Young's Mkt., 299 U.S. at 63 (holding that Section 2 of the 21st Amendment trumped the
Commerce Clause's prohibition of discriminatory treatment of out-of-state business when
dealing with alcohol).
55. Young's Mkt., 299 U.S. 59.
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imported liquors compete with the domestic on equal terms. To say that, would
involve not a construction of the [A]mendment, but a rewriting of it.5 6
The implication of this opinion is clear. The Court endorsed the idea that the 21st
Amendment unconditionally grants the states the power to regulate alcohol.57 In a
series of subsequent opinions, the Court continued to interpret the 21 st Amendment as
completely divesting alcohol of its interstate character, thereby leaving alcohol
regulations free from dormant Commerce Clause restriction. 58
B. Pulling Back on States' Power
Approximately ten years after its landmark decision in Young's Market, the
Supreme Court began to pull back on its unconditional grant of state power. A series of
cases in the 1930s and 1940s started a trend toward retracting states' power to regulate
alcohol. 59 A pair of decisions in 1964 clarified the idea that there were definite limits to
states' regulatory power over alcohol. 60
In Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., a duty-free shop located in New
York City's John F. Kennedy Airport challenged a New York statute that prohibited
the sale of duty-free alcohol within the airport.6 1 New York argued it had the right to
regulate alcohol sales under the broad powers granted in the 21st Amendment. The
Court disagreed, holding that while New York has strong regulatory powers over
alcohol, it cannot "prevent completely the transportation of liquor across the state's
territory for delivery and use in a federal enclave within it.",6 2 The Court specifically
rejected the idea that the 21st Amendment somehow "operated to 'repeal' the
Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned" as "an
absurd oversimplification." 63 Going further, Justice Stewart stated, "If the Commerce
Clause had been pro tanto 'repealed,' then Congress would be left with no regulatory
power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating liquor. Such a conclusion
would be patently bizarre and is demonstrably incorrect.
'
"
64
For the first time, the Court suggested that the Commerce Clause did, in fact,
continue to exert some power over the interstate nature of alcohol commerce: "Both
56. Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
57. Matthew J. Patterson, Note, A Brewing Debate: Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws and the
Twenty-first Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 761, 772.
58. See, e.g., Joseph S. Finch, 305 U.S. 395; Indianapolis Brewing, 305 U.S. 391.
59. See, e.g., Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131 (1944) (law requiring a permit to transport
alcohol in the state was found to be outside the bounds of the 21st Amendment because the
liquor was not intended for delivery or use within the state); Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S.
390 (1941) (same); Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938) (holding that
state authority did not apply in areas under the jurisdiction of the federal government, such as
parks and federal military reservations, even when those areas were within the borders of that
state).
60. Dep't of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964); Hostetter v.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
61. Hostetter, 377 U.S. 324.
62. Id. at 333.
63. Id. at 331-32.
64. Id. at 332.
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the 21st Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same Constitution.
Like other provisions of the Constitution, each must be considered in the light of the
other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case."
65
Thus, Hostetter introduces the emerging "accommodation test" that would later guide
the Supreme Court's approach to resolving conflicts between the Commerce Clause
and the 21st Amendment. 66
In another opinion delivered on the same day, the Supreme Court struck down a
Kentucky law that placed a ten cents per gallon tax on imported liquors. Again, the
State argued that such a regulation was properly within the powers vested in the State
by Section 2 of the 21st Amendment; again, the Court disagreed. This time the Court
rested its decision on a different constitutional provision, holding that the 21st
Amendment did not trump the Import-Export Clause of the Constitution.68 Justice
Stewart stated that the Court "has never so much as intimated that the 21st Amendment
has operated to permit what the Export-Import Clause precisely and explicitly
forbids." 69 According to Stewart, to sustain the Kentucky tax would be to support the
notion that the 21st Amendment had repealed the Export-Import Clause so far as
alcohol is concerned, a notion that the Court expressly rejected.7 °
The combination of Hostetter and James B. Beam solidified the idea of
constitutional limitations on the states' 21st Amendment rights to regulate alcohol and
paved the way for further erosion of such rights. By the 1970s, the Court began to
show signs that the limits on state power were going to continue shrinking. This era
culminated in the landmark Bacchus case, setting forth the greatest limitation on states'
21st Amendment regulatory powers.
C. The Modem Era of Accommodation
In the early 1980s, the Supreme Court completely embraced the modem
jurisprudential era of accommodation. In California Retail Liquor Dealers Association
v. Midcal Aluminum Inc., the Court ruled that a state's liquor laws can violate the
Sherman Act.7 ' Midcal Aluminum succeeded on its antitrust challenge to a California
statute that divided the state into three "trading areas" and provided that a single
wholesaler could set prices that would bind all other wholesalers in the trading area.
72
The Court agreed with Midcal's argument that this system was nothing more than an
elaborate price fixing scheme that violated the Sherman Act. California responded that
its laws did not fall under the authority of the Sherman Act since they were protected
under the 21st Amendment. In the majority opinion, the Court recognized that it had
historically interpreted the 21st Amendment very literally, granting broad regulatory
65. Id.
66. See Clayton L. Silvemail, Comment, Smoke, Mirrors, and Myopia: How the States Are
Able to Pass Unconstitutional Laws Against the Direct Shipping of Wine in Interstate
Commerce, 44 S. TEx. L. REv. 499, 521 (2003).
67. Dep't of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964).
68. Id. at 345-46.
69. Id. at 344.
70. Id. at 345-46.
71. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
72. Silvernail, supra note 66, at 523.
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power to the states. However, the Court continued, "the Federal Government retains
some Commerce Clause authority over liquor," 73 and "there is no bright line between
federal and state powers over liquor."74 The Court also held:
The Twenty-first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control over
whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor
distribution system. Although States retain substantial discretion to establish other
liquor regulations, those controls may be subject to the federal commerce power in
appropriate situations. The competing state and federal interests can be reconciled
only after careful scrutiny of those concerns in a "concrete case.""
Throughout the rest of the decade, the Supreme Court continued to add to Midcal's
foundation to create what is now known as the "accommodation doctrine," the modem
analytical framework used to approach 21 st Amendment jurisprudence.76
Bacchus Imports v. Dias, the quintessential example of the modem accommodation
doctrine, is the current controlling Supreme Court case for 21st Amendment issues.
77
Finally, the Court directly pronounced that the dormant Commerce Clause applied to
state alcohol regulation despite the grant of state power from the 21 st Amendment. Up
until Bacchus, previous cases never expressly stated that the dormant Commerce
Clause applied; in fact, the Court maintained in most cases that the states retained the
sole power to regulate alcohol within their borders.
78
In Bacchus, the plaintiffs challenged a twenty percent Hawaiian liquor tax that
exempted locally produced alcoholic drinks. 79 For the first time, the Court used the
dormant Commerce Clause to strike down a state liquor law and held that Hawaii could
not place a tax on out-of-state liquor while using an exemption to favor in-state
80alcohol. Instead of using the 21st Amendment to analyze the tax, the Court first
discussed the issue of economic protectionism under the dormant Commerce Clause.
8 1
Only after determining that the tax violated the dormant Commerce Clause as a
73. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 108.
74. Id. at 110.
75. Id. (internal citations omitted).
76. Silvemail, supra note 66, at 524; see, e.g., 44 LiquorMart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484 (1996); North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491
U.S. 324 (1989); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479
U.S. 335 (1987); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Brown-Forman Distillers v. N.Y. State
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
77. 468 U.S. 263.
78. See Eric T. Freeman, Comment, The Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce
Clause: What Rationale Supports Bacchus Imports?, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 361,383 (1986)
(noting that Bacchus exceeded any precedent and was, in fact, a new interpretation of Section 2
of the 21 st Amendment).
79. See Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 265.
80. Id. at 274-75.
81. Id. at 270.
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discriminatory measure designed to protect the local "ti root okolehao" 82 industry did
the Court address the issue of whether the 21st Amendment could save the tax.
83
In addressing this issue, the Court continued to pull away from the broad language
in Young's Market. To support its decision to further erode state power under the 21 st
Amendment, the Court cited the "obscurity of the legislative history of § 2"84 and the
development of the accommodation doctrine through Hostetter and Midcal.85 Citing
Hostetter, the Court stated that "[b]oth the Twenty-first Amendment and the
Commerce Clause are parts of the same Constitution [and] each must be considered in
light of the other and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete
case." 86 Finally the Court held:
State laws that constitute mere economic protectionism are.., not entitled to the
same deference as laws enacted to combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted
traffic in liquor. Here, the State does not seek to justify its tax on the ground that it
was designed to promote temperance or to carry out any other purpose of the
Twenty-first Amendment, but instead acknowledges that the purpose was "to
promote a local industry."
87
Although somewhat ambiguous, the Court's holding seems to indicate that temperance
may be the only viable purpose for state alcohol regulations. Under the authority of
Bacchus, today's heated direct shipment debate has come to fruition.
IV. DIRECT SHIPMENT LITIGATION
A. Varieties of Direct Shipment Laws
Most states have developed a three-tiered regulatory system for the distribution and
taxation of wine. Wine producers must first register with the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax
and Trade Bureau to obtain a basic permit to produce their product. The producer then
sells its wine to a licensed wholesaler who is responsible for paying the excise taxes.
88
The wholesaler then distributes the wine to retailers who collect sales taxes from retail
consumers.
89
After Prohibition, the three-tiered system developed with the goals of "reduc[ing]
organized crime, monopolies, and the sale of alcohol to minors while providing a more
efficient means of tax collection and promoting temperance by keeping the price of
82. "Okolehao" is a brandy distilled from the root of the Ti plant-an indigenous Hawaiian
shrub. Id. at 265.
83. Id. at 274.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 275.
86. Id. (quoting Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964)).
87. Id. at 276 (internal citations omitted).
88. FED. TRADE COMM'N, POssIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: WINE 5
(2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
89. See Kristin Woeste, Comment, Reds, Whites, and Roses: The Dormant Commerce
Clause, the Twenty-first Amendment, and the Direct Shipment of Wine, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 1821,
1823 (2004).
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alcohol artificially high." 90 States enacted laws regulating the direct shipment of
alcohol to make sure that out-of-state producers could not circumvent their regulations.
Three main varieties of direct shipment laws exist: reciprocity laws, limited
shipment laws, and antidirect shipment laws. 91 Most states completely prohibit direct
shipment.
92
1. Reciprocity States
Thirteen states are categorized as "reciprocity states." 93 In a reciprocity state, wine
producers may ship directly to consumers in other states that have extended a
reciprocal right. Simply put, "a winery in your state can ship to a consumer in my state,
only if a winery in my state can ship to a consumer in your state.",94 In 1986, California
became the first state to enact a reciprocity law regulating the direct shipment of
wine.95 Since then, California has been joined by Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia, and
96Wisconsin. Although these states all extend some level of reciprocity to each other,
"some states are more 'reciprocal' than others. 97
Reciprocity arrangements are met with stiff opposition from wholesalers and
retailers, based on concerns that direct shipments will infringe upon their stranglehold
over the market. 98 Because liquor wholesaling and distribution is a multi-billion dollar
business, wholesalers and retailers exert strong lobbying power over state
legislatures. 99 To protect their market share, wholesalers and retailers use forceful
lobbying power to prevent additional states from enacting reciprocity laws.
90. Id.
91. James Molnar, Comment, Under the Influence: Why Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws Are
a Violation of the Commerce Clause, 9 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 169, 172 (2001).
92. Id. For a complete listing of all states and their direct shipment laws, see The Wine
Institute, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About Direct Interstate Wine Shipments,
http://www.wineinstitute.org/shipwine/faq/faq.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2006) [hereinafter The
Wine Institute].
93. Reciprocity states include California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id.
94. Id.
95. Id. California's direct shipment law reads in part:
Notwithstanding any other law, an individual or retail licensee in a state that
affords California licensees or individuals an equal reciprocal shipping privilege,
may ship, for personal use and not for resale, not more than two cases of wine (no
more than nine liters each case) per month to any adult resident in this state.
Delivery of a shipment pursuant to this subdivision shall not be deemed to
constitute a sale in this state.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23661.2 (West 2005).
96. See The Wine Institute, supra note 92.
97. Id. For example, Minnesota, Missouri, and Wisconsin only permit their residents to
import two cases per year, and Colorado only allows direct shipments if the purchaser makes the
purchase in another state and has the wine shipped to his home. Id.
98. Id.
99. Molnar, supra note 91, at 173.
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2. Limited Direct Shipping
Limited direct shipment states enact laws allowing out-of-state wineries to ship to
their consumers under strict limitations.'°° The majority of these laws follow the Wine
Industry Model Direct Shipping Bill proposed in 1997 by the Family Winemakers of
California, the Coalition for Free Trade, The Wine Institute, and the American
Vintners Association and adopted by the National Conference of State Legislatures,
Task Force on the Wine Industry.10 1 Usually, these laws contain provisions requiring
an out-of-state winery to obtain a license or permit, collect and pay taxes to the
recipient state, limit quantities shipped, pack wine in such a way to keep it from
underage consumers, and report their shipments to the appropriate state authority.1l 2
100. Id. at 172.
101. See The Wine Institute, supra note 92 (For information on the Model Direct Shipping
Bill, click on the hyperlink entitled "What is a Limited Direct/Permit State?" under the "II.
Questions about Limited/Direct Shipment States" heading.).
102. The Model Direct Shipment Bill reads:
Add new Section-to the Alcohol Beverage Control Act as follows: Section-
1. Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, any person currently
licensed in any other state as an alcoholic beverage producer, supplier, importer,
wholesaler, distributor or retailer who obtains an out-of-state shipper's license, as
provided below, may ship up to twenty-four (24) bottles per month of any alcoholic
beverage directly to a resident of [State] who is at least 21 years of age for such
resident's personal use and not for resale.
2. Before sending any shipment to a resident of [State] the out-of-state shipper must
first:
(a) File an application with the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
(Department),
(b) pay a $100.00 registration fee,
(c) provide to the Department a true copy of its current alcoholic beverage license
issued in another state, and
(d) obtain from the Department an out-of-state shipper's license.
3. All out-of-state shipper licensees shall:
(a) Not ship more than twenty-four (24) bottles per month to any person.
(b) Not ship to any address in an area identified by the Department as a "dry" or
local option area.
(c) Ensure that all containers of alcoholic beverages shipped directly to a resident in
this state are conspicuously labeled with the words "CONTAINS ALCOHOL:
SIGNATURE OF PERSON AGE 21 OR OLDER REQUIRED FOR DELIVERY."
(d) Report to the Department annually the total of alcoholic beverages, by type,
shipped into the state the preceding calendar year.
(e) Annually pay to the [State Revenue Agency] all sales taxes and excise taxes due
on sales to residents of [State] in the preceding calendar year, the amount of such
taxes to be calculated as if the sale were in [State] at the location where delivery is
made.
(f) Permit the Department or the [State Revenue Agency] to perform an audit of the
out-of-state shipper's records upon request.
(g) Be deemed to have consented to the jurisdiction of the Department or any other
state agency and the [State] courts concerning enforcement of this section and any
related laws, rules or regulations.
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3. Anti-direct Shipping
Anti-direct shipment states completely forbid out-of-state wineries to ship directly
to its consumers.10 3 In many of these states, it is even a felony to have wine shipped
directly to consumers from an out-of-state winery. 104 The vast majority of these states
are located in the southern United States, where wine production and consumption is
more limited.
B. Why Has Direct Shipment Become Such a Hot Issue?
In the aggregate, domestic wine production has contributed $45 billion to the
national economy.1° 5 A small number of large wineries dominate the market by
distributing through the "three-tier" regulatory system.'°6 However, the proportion of
American wine produced by small, family farm wineries has increased dramatically in
recent years. Estimates show that nearly 3000 such wineries exist throughout all fifty
4. The out-of-state shipper may annually renew its license with the Department by
paying a $-.00 renewal fee and providing the Department a true copy of its current
alcoholic beverage license issued in another state.
5. The Department and the [State Revenue Agency] may promulgate rules and
regulations to effectuate the purposes of this law.
6. The Department may enforce the requirements of this section by administrative
proceedings to suspend or revoke an out-of-state shipper's license, and the
Department may accept payment of an offer in compromise in lieu of suspension,
such payments to be determined by rule promulgated by the Department.
7. Shipments of alcoholic beverages from out-of-state direct to consumers in [State]
from persons who do not possess a current out-of-state shipper's license or other
permit or license from the Department are prohibited[.] Any person who knowingly
makes, participates in, transports, imports or receives such a shipment from out-of-
state is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by [insert fine and/or jail]. Without
limitation on any punishment or remedy, criminal or civil, any person who
knowingly makes, participates in, transports, imports or receives such a shipment
from out-of-state commits an unfair trade practice.
National Conference of State Legislatures, Task Force on the Wine Industry, Model Direct
Shipment Bill (Nov. 5, 1997), available at http://www.wineinstitute.org/shipwine/ (For the text
of the Model Direct Shipment Bill, click on the "FAQs" link at the top of the page. Then click
on the link entitled "What is a Limited Direct/Permit State?" under the heading "11. Questions
about Limited/Direct Shipment states." Then click on the link entitled "Model Direct Shipping
Bill.").
103. Molnar, supra note 91, at 172.
104. See FLA. STAT. § 561.545 (1997); IND. CODE §§ 7.1-5-11-1.5, 7.1-5-1-9.5 (2005); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 244.165 (West 1996); MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 16-506.1 (1999); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 37, § 505 (1999) (felony if shipped directly to minor, otherwise direct shipping
constitutes a misdemeanor); TENN. CODEANN. § 57-3-401 (1992); UTAHCODEANN. § 32A-12-
201 (2004).
105. WineAmerica, Wine Facts, http://www.wineamerica.org/newsroom/winefacts04.htm
(last visited Oct. 26, 2005).
106. See Brief for Respondents at 1, Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005) (Nos. 03-
1116, 03-1120), available at http://www.law.indiana.edu/webinit/tanford/wine/headFINAL
.pdf.
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states-twice the number of thirty years ago. 0 7 Because these wineries produce only a
small amount of wine each year, it is economically infeasible for them to sell their
wines through the traditional three-tier system. 108 In fact, most small wineries cannot
even find distributors willing to carry their products due to production and volume
requirements. 19 The only way these wineries can get their products to consumers is
through on-site tasting rooms and direct shipments.
The development of e-commerce has provided these small wineries an amazing
opportunity to gain access to a much larger market. By selling wine through the
Internet, small wineries are able to place their products into the hands of consumers
across the country, many of whom otherwise would not have the opportunity to
discover the wine. 0 With the rise of direct shipments, especially via Internet orders,
wholesalers and retailers are experiencing an erosion of their current market share. As
a result, they have boosted their lobbying efforts in order to pressure state legislatures
to enact laws that limit such practices."'
In response, small wineries collaborated to fight the wholesalers' attempts to restrict
direct sales. The organized wineries turned to the courts, filing lawsuits claiming that
state direct shipment laws limiting or prohibiting out-of-state wineries from shipping to
in-state consumers violate the dormant Commerce Clause."
2
C. Current Direct Shipment Litigation: The Circuits' Split
Since Bacchus, the constitutional validity of many states' direct shipment laws have
been challenged. Many of the challenged laws directly discriminate against out-of-state
alcohol producers, while protecting in-state producers by allowing them to sell directly
to consumers and forcing out-of-state producers to sell through the three-tier
distribution system. Prior to Granholm, nearly every circuit court of appeals addressed
the issue of direct shipment.' 3 However, from this myriad of decisions, no single
107. Id. at 2.
108. Id.
109. Molnar, supra note 91, at 173.
110. FIC REPORr, supra note 88, at 1.
111. Molnar, supra note 91, at 173.
112. See, e.g., Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004); Beskind v. Easley, 325
F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003); Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003); Dickerson v. Bailey,
336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003); Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000);
Glazer's Wholesale Drug Co. v. Kansas, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (D. Kan. 2001).
113. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 228 (upholding New York's regulatory scheme that permitted
the importation of out-of-state wine only if the out-of-state producer maintained a "factory,
office, or storeroom" inside the state of New York); Beskind, 325 F.3d 506 (overturning a North
Carolina regulatory system that exempted in-state wineries from the traditional three-tier
distribution system); Heald, 342 F.3d at 519 (holding that Michigan's regulatory system that
permitted direct shipment from in-state wineries while prohibiting the same practice for out-of-
state wineries was "facially discriminatory" and did not promote one of the "core concerns of
the State's power under the Twenty-first Amendment"); Dickerson, 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir.
2003) (holding Texas's regulatory system unconstitutional); Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d
1104 (2002) (holding Florida's regulatory system that exempted in-state wineries from a direct
shipment ban violated the dormant Commerce Clause); Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d 848 (upholding
Indiana's regulatory system despite a discriminatory impact on out-of-state wineries).
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consensus was reached in answering the question--can a state constitutionally
discriminate against direct shipment from out-of-state wineries?
V. GRANHOLM V. HEALD: THE SUPREME COURT TACKLES THE ISSUE
On May 24, 2004, the Supreme Court consolidated an appeal by the state of
Michigan from the Sixth Circuit's decision in Heald v. Engler with an appeal by an
out-of-state winery from the Second Circuit's decision in Swedenburg v. Kelly. The
Court granted certiorari, limited to the question, "Does a State's regulatory scheme that
permits in-state wineries directly to ship alcohol to consumers but restricts the ability
of out-of-state wineries to do so violate the dormant Commerce Clause in light of Sec.
2 of the 21st Amendment?""14
In the Michigan case, the state of Michigan and the Michigan Beer and Wine
Wholesalers Association appealed the Sixth Circuit's ruling that Michigan's laws
violated the dormant Commerce Clause. Michigan and their wholesalers' contingency
joined forces with the New York appeal respondents to argue that their respective
states have the power under the 21 st Amendment to regulate alcohol, even when such
regulations discriminate in favor of in-state wineries. The respondents from the
Michigan appeal combined with the petitioners from the New York appeal to argue to
the contrary. Due to the confusing nature of the consolidated case, the Michigan
petitioners and the New York respondents will be referred to as the "Anti-Direct
Shipment Coalition," and the Michigan respondents and New York petitioners as the
"Free Trade Group."
The Anti-Direct Shipment Coalition's basic argument was that the 21st
Amendment's plain language gives the states the power to rationally regulate the
importation of alcohol across their borders. They argued that the Amendment carves
out an exception to the dormant Commerce Clause, primarily finding support in
Young's Market. 15 In an attempt to distinguish Bacchus, petitioners state that the "best
reading of Bacchus is that the tax exemption [in Bacchus] was unconstitutional because
it did not involve the regulation of the physical importation of beverage alcohol and
was admittedly 'mere protectionism."" 6 Using Midcal as primary support, they made
this "physical importation" distinction throughout their briefs." 7 They argued that the
Michigan regulatory scheme and the New York system give their states the
enforcement power necessary to ensure that liquor is effectively monitored and taxed.
Furthermore, the Anti-Direct Shipment Coalition argued that no additional regulations
are needed for in-state wineries because these wineries are already effectively
monitored."'
114. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 541 U.S. 1062 (2004); see also Granholm v. Heald, 541 U.S.
1062 (2004). The consolidation of these cases is now known as Granholm v. Heald.
115. Brief for Petitioner at 17-18, Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005) (No. 03-
1116), available at http://www.law.indiana.edu/webinit/tanford/wine/granholmmerits.pdf.
116. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005) (No 03-1120)
(quoting Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984)), available at
http://www.law.indiana.edu /webinit/tanford/wine/lMBWWAmerits.pdf.
117. See, e.g., id. at 14.
118. Id. at 13-14.
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The Free Trade Group argued that Michigan's and New York's discriminatory
regulations violated the dormant Commerce Clause because the laws were facially
discriminatory and therefore the Court should apply a "virtually per se rule of
invalidity."' 9 They further argued that the States, under the 21st Amendment, may
"regulate intensively, even to the point of prohibition. But [they] may not
discriminate."1 20 They argued that the States' regulatory schemes were merely
economic protectionism and that Bacchus should rule. Furthermore, they insisted that
the Court had come a long way since the sweeping view of Young's Market. The Free
Trade Group also recognized that the dormant Commerce Clause cases left open the
possibility that statutes that discriminated against interstate commerce could be upheld
if they advanced legitimate local purposes that could not be served by reasonable, non-
discriminatory means. They then argued that neither Michigan nor New York had even
come close to meeting this burden and that reasonable, non-discriminatory alternatives
existed. 121
A. The Court's Decision
On May 14, 2005, the Supreme Court held that both regulatory schemes
"discriminate against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause... and
that the discrimination is neither authorized nor permitted by the 21 st Amendment."'
22
The Court firmly routed its decision in a long standing notion:
[Prohibiting the discrimination of out-of-state economic interests] is essential to
the foundations of the Union... [and] "reflects a central concern of the Framers
that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the
conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the
tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the
Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation."'
' 23
The Court analogized such discriminatory practices to "an ongoing, low-level trade
war" that "invites a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of the very
purpose of the Commerce Clause."1
24
After finding that both Michigan's and New York's discriminatory practices
violated the Commerce Clause, the Court turned to the question of whether the
regulatory schemes could be saved by the 21st Amendment. 25 The Court was clear in
its answer: "Section 2 [of the 21 st Amendment] does not allow States to regulate the
direct shipment of wine on terms that discriminate in favor of in-state producers."'
126
119. Brief for Respondents, supra note 106, at 9 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617, 624 (1978)) (emphasis in original).
120. Id. at 10.
121. Id. at 35-47 (for argument regarding Michigan's scheme); see also Petitioner's Brief on
the Merits, Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005) (No. 03-1274), 2004 WL 2430212 (for
argument regarding New York's scheme).
122. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1892.
123. Id. at 1895 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979)).
124. Id. at 1896.
125. Id. at 1897.
126. Id. (emphasis added).
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In answering the States' argument that invalidation of their direct shipment laws
would call into question the constitutional validity of the traditional three-tier alcohol
distribution system, the Court stated that the three-tier system is "unquestionably
legitimate" as long as the State applies the system in a non-discriminatory manner.,27
After finding that the discriminatory alcohol regulation schemes violated the
Commerce Clause and were not saved by the 21st Amendment, the Court turned its
inquiry to whether the States' practices "advance[d] a legitimate local purpose that
cannot be adequately served by reasonable non-discriminatory alternatives."'128 To
support their regulatory schemes, the states proffered two primary justifications:
"keeping alcohol out of the hands of minors and facilitating tax collection." 129 The
Court rejected both justifications stating,
[Tihe States provide little concrete evidence for the sweeping assertion that they
cannot police direct shipments by out-of-state wineries. Our Commerce Clause
cases demand more than mere speculation to support discrimination against out-
of-state goods. The burden is on the State to show that the discrimination is
demonstrably justified. The Court has upheld state regulations that discriminate
against interstate commerce only after finding, based on concrete record evidence,
that a State's nondiscriminatory alternatives will prove unworkable. Michigan and
New York have not satisfied this exacting standard. 130
With its decision in Granholm, the Court may have left the states with only two
options: (1) completely prohibit all direct shipment of wine, from both in-state and out-
of-state wineries or (2) permit the direct shipment of wine without discriminatory
regulations burdening out-of-state wineries' business with in-state consumers.
However, as Part VI sets forth, the answer is not that simple.
VI. HISTORICAL ANALOGIES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO DIRECT SHIPMENT
In Granholm v. Heald, the Court marked an important shift in how the states may
use their powers to regulate direct shipment under the 21 st Amendment. States like
Michigan and New York, whose laws facially discriminate against out-of-state wineries
in favor of in-state vintners, must now rewrite their laws.
However, most states will not simply give up and open their borders to direct
shipment from out-of-state wineries. The wholesalers' political lobbying power is too
great for any sudden changes to occur in the majority of states. In Florida, for example,
Southern Wine and Spirits-the largest liquor wholesaler in the country-successfully
lobbied the Florida legislature to pass a law making direct shipment from out-of-state
wineries a felony.' Prior to the law's passage, Southern contributed over $60,000 to
candidates voting in favor of the law. 32 Legislators will be unwilling to part with the
127. Id. at 1905 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1986)).
128. Id. (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).
129. Id.
130. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotations omitted) (internal
parenthetical omitted).
131. See Molnar, supra note 91, at 175.
132. Id.
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monetary contributions that wholesaler and retailer lobbyists can provide. Thus,
changes will not occur quickly or easily.
If states cannot discriminate against out-of-state wineries, how will legislators
continue to appease lobbyists without violating the Supreme Court's mandate? History
indicates that states will remove facially discriminatory laws while continuing de facto
discrimination against out-of-state wineries by enacting facially neutral statutes.
A. Example: School Desegregation
The history of school desegregation in the United States provides an interesting
historical analogy for how states react to unpopular Supreme Court decisions. It is
quite possible that states may react in a similar manner to the decision in Granholm.
Brown v. Board of Education 133 is arguably the most important Supreme Court
decision of the last one hundred years. In the midst of Jim Crow laws and brutal racial
discrimination in the South, the Court ordered the desegregation of public schools on
May 17, 1954.13 However, states did not immediately comply with the Court's
declaration that "racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional.' 35
Segregation played an important part in the society of the South, and desegregation
was not something to which the southern states would easily succumb. Initially, most
school districts simply refused to comply with the Court's mandate. Pupil placement
programs and freedom of choice replaced pure segregation in many districts.' 36 In fact,
all southern states adopted placement laws which granted appointed administrators the
power to "place students according to a long list of racially neutral factors such as
students' residence, psychological fitness, scholastic aptitude, health and moral
standards .... and availability of space and transportation."' 37 Although under Brown
states could no longer discriminate on the basis of race, they passed facially neutral
laws that divided students among the schools based on factors seemingly unrelated to
race. The "purpose and effect of these plans was to enable administrators to maintain
segregation, while insulating the system from legal challenge because of the difficulty
of proving that a multifactor decision was racially motivated."' 38
States also eschewed desegregation through the use of neighborhood schools. These
programs were facially neutral because all students, both black and white, had the
power to transfer to a different school. However, because neighborhood schools
usually offered "broad transfer rights," allowing students to transfer from one school to
another, the effect of the program was the continuation of segregated schools. The vast
majority of white students transferred out of their newly desegregated schools into
schools that were all white, and most blacks chose not to desegregate as well. 139
133. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
134. Id. at 483, 495.
135. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955) (citing Brown I and
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)).
136. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FRoM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 358 (2004).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 358-59.
139. Id. at 359 ("The vast majority of whites exercised minority-to-majority transfer options
to leave desegregated schools to which they had been assigned. Most blacks who were eligible
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It was not until the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s that the courts
finally cracked down on these de facto discriminatory practices."4° After Brown,
Tennessee enacted a Pupil Assignment Law141 that continued students in their
previously enrolled schools and granted exclusive power to local school boards to
grant or deny transfer options. 42 The Sixth Circuit held that the law was inadequate in
Northcross v. Board of Education. 143 According to the court, "[tihe Pupil Assignment
Law might serve some purpose in the administration of a school system but it will not
serve as a plan to convert a biracial system into a nonracial one."'
144
Tennessee was not easily thwarted in its desire to continue a racially segregated
school system. Instead of implementing a plan that might truly desegregate the schools,
Tennessee implemented a system of neighborhood schools. The plan provided for "the
automatic assignment of pupils living within attendance zones drawn by the Board or
school officials along geographic or 'natural' boundaries and 'according to the capacity
and facilities of the [school] buildings...' within the zones."'145 The plan also offered
"free transfers" to any child who had registered in his attendance zone and wished to be
transferred.'4 However, black students were systematically denied their "free
transfers," and the schools continued to maintain their pre-Brown racial identities. It
was not until 1968, fourteen years after Brown, that the Supreme Court finally granted
certiorari to examine this system.
47
In two cases heard on the same day, the Court struck down the Tennessee system
and a similar system in Virginia on the grounds that their plans did "not meet
respondent's 'affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to
a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch.""148 Even after these decisions, it would be many years before states stopped
looking for ways to circumvent the mandate of the Supreme Court.
49
B. School Prayer
Another line of Court decisions and subsequent state responses might prove
insightful in predicting how states will respond to the recent ruling prohibiting
discrimination against out-of-state wineries. Forty years have passed since the Supreme
for desegregation opted out as well.").
140. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala.
1952), afjdper curiam, 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
141. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1701 to -1740 (1956), invalidated by Northcross v. Bd. of
Educ., 302 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962).
142. Monroe v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450,453 (1968).
143. 302 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962).
144. id. at 821.
145. Monroe, 391 U.S. at 453-54 (quoting Monroe v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 221 F. Supp. 968,
974 (W.D. Tenn. 1963)).
146. Id. at 454.
147. See id. at 450; Green v. County Sch. Rd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
148. Monroe, 391 U.S. at 458 (quoting Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38).
149. Even as late as 1973, the Court was still hearing cases concerning the desegregation of
public schools. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (finding that
segregative school board activities in a large portion of a school system created a prima facie
case of unconstitutional segregation and placed a burden on school authorities to show that
other schools within the system were not segregated intentionally).
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Court first prohibited the use of official prayers in public schools,'5 yet school systems
today still try to find ways to include prayer in the classroom. Much like the response
to Brown, states fought the decision restricting prayer in the classroom. After Schempp
and Engel prohibited official classroom prayers, states rewrote their statutes to avoid
facially violating the Constitution.
For example, Alabama enacted three statutes that seemingly did not violate the
mandate from Schempp and Engel. In 1978, the Alabama legislature enacted section
16-1-20,' which "authorized [a] one minute period of silence in all public schools for
meditation.""' In 1981, the legislature added a provision that authorized "a period of
silence... for meditation or voluntary prayer 1.... ,53 In 1982, the legislature added
another provision,' 54 permitting teachers "lead willing students in prayer ... [to]
Almighty God... the Creator and Supreme Judge of the world."'155 Alabama Senator
Donald Homes, the sponsor of the bill that became section 16-1-20.1, admitted on the
legislative record that the purpose of the bill was to return voluntary prayer to the
schools. 156 These statutes persisted until the Supreme Court struck them down in
Wallace v. Jaffree in 1985.157
Even after the Court ruled that including the words "voluntary prayer" in the
Alabama statute violated the First Amendment, 58 the school prayer issue was far from
over. States continued to push the constitutional limits of the Wallace ruling.
150. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
151. The Alabama Code read:
[a]t the commencement of the first class each day in the first through the sixth
grades in all public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which each such
class is held shall announce that a period of silence, not to exceed one minute in
duration, shall be observed for meditation, and during any such period silence
shall be maintained and no activities engaged in.
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1986), invalidated by Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
152. Id.
153. The Alabama Code read, in part, "At the commencement of the first class of each day..
in all public schools, the teacher in charge... may announce that a period of silene ... shall
be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such period no other activities
shall be engaged in." ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1986), invalidated by Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38 (1985).
154. The Alabama Code read:
[f]rom henceforth, any teacher or professor in any public educational institution
within the state of Alabama, recognizing that the Lord God is one, at the beginning
of any homeroom or any class, may pray, may lead willing students in prayer, or
may lead the willing students in the following prayer to God:
Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge You as the Creator
and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your justice, Your truth, and Your
peace abound this day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the counsels of our
government, in the sanctity of our homes and in the classrooms of our schools
in the name of our Lord. Amen.
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984), invalidated by Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
155. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40 (internal quotations omitted).
156. Id. at 56-57.
157. See id. at 48.
158. Id. at 60-61.
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In 1992, the Court decided Lee v. Weisman.15 9 In this case, the Court faced the issue
of whether a Rhode Island school's practice of inviting a clergyman to offer invocation
and benediction prayers during high school graduation violated the First Amendment.
The Court ruled that it did. 60
Despite the Supreme Court's ruling against the use of school-sponsored prayer in
1962, decades passed before the states finally accepted their fate. Using facially neutral
laws, the states were able to hold on to a practice that clearly violated the Constitution.
C. Application of Historical Analogies to Direct Shipment of Wine
In each of the historical examples provided, states fought to hold on to practices
outlawed by the Supreme Court. In each case, the Court's ruling prohibited a very
specific practice. In Brown, it was statutorily imposed segregated schools. In Schempp
and Engel, it was official school prayers. These decisions proved unpopular with the
states. Instead of accepting the Court's decisions, the states created new plans and
schemes to test the Constitution's limits. To appease the mandate of desegregation,
states implemented Pupil Placement Programs or neighborhood school systems,
essentially holding on to segregation without violating the Constitution. To continue
allowing school prayers after their prohibition, states implemented statutes authorizing
voluntary prayer or a moment of silence. Because the Court's decisions in Schempp
and Engel did not specifically address these issues, states were able to continue the
practice of school-sponsored prayer. In each situation, decades and countless Supreme
Court decisions passed before states finally conceded to the true intent of the original
decisions in Brown, Schempp, and Engle.
From examining the historical development of desegregation and school prayer
laws, we can develop a useful analytical framework that can be applied to the direct
shipment issue. First, the Court passes an unpopular decision that requires the states to
change their laws. Second, the states respond with resistance. Third, the states apply
the Court's decision in the narrowest way and implement new laws which seemingly
satisfy the Court's requirements. The new laws, on their face, are completely neutral
and constitutional; in application, however, these new laws continue the outlawed
practice. Fourth, the Court addresses each new situation individually. With each new
decision, the Court seeks to clarify its initial holding. And finally, after many years, the
states concede and the outlawed practice is officially abolished.
This same pattern will occur in the coming years as states react to the Supreme
Court's decision in Granholm v. Heald. While some states may accept the Court's
decision outright and implement a completely nondiscriminatory alcohol regulation
system, many states will resist change. Further litigation will take place before all
facially discriminatory direct shipment laws are struck down. States resisting the shift
toward completely opening their borders to direct shipment from out-of-state wineries
will rewrite their laws to avoid de jure discrimination against out-of-state wineries.
However, the practical effect of these new laws will be to continue de facto
discrimination against out-of-state vintners. These states will have no problem finding
159. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
160. Id. at 599.
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examples of facially neutral direct shipment statutes that effectually continue
discrimination.
Indiana is a prime example of a state that continues to work de facto discrimination
against out-of-state wineries. Indiana's direct shipment and alcohol transportation laws
prohibit both in-state and out-of-state wineries from directly shipping to Indiana
residents.' 61 This blanket prohibition of direct shipping inflicts no de jure
discrimination against out-of-state wineries and falls within the direction of the Court's
opinion in Granholm. Indiana farm wineries, however, are authorized to
simultaneously act as manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer, and are thus essentially
exempt from the three-tier system that normally prohibits one from holding a license at
more than one of these tiers.' 62 In other words, an Indiana farm winery can both
produce and then sell its wine at retail. Another Indiana provision permits wine
retailers to "sell... wine ... for at-home delivery."'' 63 Hence, a farm winery that also
holds a wine retailer's license can make deliveries directly to Indiana residents and
completely bypass the three-tier system.
Section 7.1-5-11 -1 of the Indiana Code prohibits Indiana residents from importing
liquor, except by explicit statutory authorization.164 Only section 7.1-5-11-15
authorizes importation: "[tihis section shall not prohibit a person... from bringing into
this state a quantity of liquor or wine not exceeding one (1) quart if he is a traveler in
the ordinary course of travel . ,,.65 On the other hand, in-state wineries can sell
directly to customers from their winery premises.166 Therefore, Indiana residents can
bypass the three-tier system by going directly to an in-state winery and purchasing
wine. Essentially, in-state wineries in Indiana can sell directly to customers and ship
their product to the consumer's home while out-of-state wineries must sell any amount
of wine exceeding one bottle through the costly three-tier system.
The inequality of access to Indiana consumers between out-of-state and in-state
wineries is de facto discrimination against out-of-state wineries. Through the enactment
of facially neutral statutes, Indiana, in effect, discriminates against out-of-state
vintners. It will be an interesting issue whether this tangle of alcohol regulations will
fall under constitutional scrutiny following the decision in Granholm.
161. The Indiana Code reads, in part: "[i]t is unlawful for a person in the business of selling
alcoholic beverages in another state or country to ship or cause to be shipped an alcoholic
beverage directly to an Indiana resident who does not hold a valid wholesaler permit under this
title." IND. CODE § 7.1-5-11-1.5(a) (2004).
162. Section 7.1-3-14-3 of the Indiana Code prohibits a holder of another permit (i.e., wine
wholesaler's permit) from obtaining a wine retailer's permit: "The commission may issue a wine
retailer's permit only to the following: (a) A person who is not the holder of, nor an applicant
for, any other permit .... IND. CODE § 7.1-3-14-3 (2004). However, section 7.1-3-12-5(a)(5)
exempts holders of farm winery permits from the provisions of section 7.1-3-14. Therefore, a
native Indiana farm winery may hold both a farm winery permit for the production of wine and a
retailer's permit for the sale of wine.
163. Id. § 7.1-3-14-4(c).
164. Id. § 7.1-5-11-1.
165. Id. § 7.1-5-11-15.
166. " e holder of a farm winery permit: ... (3) is entitled to sell the winery's wine on the
licensed premises to consumers either by the glass, or by the bottle, or both ..." Id. § 7.1-3-12-
5(a)(3).
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Similarly, in the wake of Granholm Michigan and New York can continue to
discriminate against out-of-state wineries by passing legislation that only inflicts de
facto discrimination. In this way, legislators can assure that New York and Michigan
residents have direct access to in-state wineries, while at the same time forcing out-of-
state wineries into the costly three-tier distribution system.
Another way that states might continue discriminating against out-of-state wineries
is through a discriminatory licensing scheme. Because the Court's decision in
Granholm maintains that states may implement a discriminatory regulatory scheme that
supports one of the core concerns of the 21st Amendment, states could claim that a
discriminatory licensing scheme helps raise revenues or ensure an orderly market.
67
Such a scheme might require a more expensive shipping license for out-of-state
wineries than for in-state wineries.168 The additional cost could probably be justified
even under Granholm's rationale. The Supreme Court will need to review such
licensing requirements to determine the cost limits for out-of-state wine shipping
licenses.
CONCLUSION
If history can be any guide, states will not give up their direct shipping restrictions
without a fight. Following its decision in Granholm, the Supreme Court should expect
to see states making changes in their direct shipping policies. In response, some states
might completely open their borders to out-of-state direct shipping. However, the
courts should be prepared for resistance and should expect for these discriminatory
practices to continue, as some states attempt to push the constitutional limits of
Granholm's holding. The true intent of Granholm is clear-states cannot treat in-state
and out-of-state direct shipping differently. However, it will take time for this true
intent to be realized.
167. See, e.g., Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 516-17 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing core
concerns of the 21 st Amendment).
168. See, e.g., NEB. STAT. REV. §§ 53-123.15(4), 53-124(11) (2002) (providing that out-of-
state wineries wishing to ship directly to Nebraska residents must obtain a shipping license at a
cost of $500); S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-747 (Supp. 2004) (requiring out-of-state wineries to
obtain a shipper's license to sell directly to a resident of the state); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-
204(c)(ii) (2005) (permitting out-of-state wineries to ship directly to in-state consumers upon
obtaining a $50 license); Application for Out of State Wine Shippers License, ABL-571 (rev.
July 3, 2003), available at http://www.sctax.org/NR/rdonlyres/28A1EE91-3802-4A8B-B261-
8D958EFB96DB /0/ab1571.pdf (requiring payment of a $600 biennial fee).
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